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Abstract 
This paper provides an explanation for the non-specificity of emotion inferences found in 
previous research (e.g., Gygax, Garnham & Oakhill, 2004). We first demonstrate that 
behavioral components of emotions, as opposed to emotions per se, are better markers of 
readers’ mental representations of the main character’s affective status. We also suggest that 
in a self-paced reading paradigm, when participants read sentences slower than others, it does 
not unequivocally provide insight into their mental representations of the text. We show that 
specific control conditions need to be implemented before such an assumption can be made in 
order to separate inference and representation processes from contextual integration 
processes.   
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Emotion inferences during reading comprehension: What evidence can the self-pace reading 
paradigm provide? 
The investigation of characters’ emotion inferences has emerged in the last thirteen 
years as an important research area in the field of text comprehension (e.g. Gernsbacher, 
Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; de Vega, Diaz, & Leon, 1997). Theories of text comprehension 
contend that as readers process text, they form a mental representation of the text (van den 
Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1998; Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994). This mental 
representation includes information pertaining to the people, settings, actions and events 
either described explicitly or implied by the text (Garnham, 1996). This particular idea is 
partly rooted in the notion of mental models, as advanced by Johnson-Laird (1983). Of prime 
concern is the fact that when reading a text, we cannot compute all the information presented 
to us, mainly because of processing limitations. We therefore construct a model of the 
situation, what can be referred to as a state of the world (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994), based on 
some elements presented to us and based on information stored in long-term memory. Mental 
models therefore comprise elements of the text and elements derived (or inferred) from the 
text as the result of interpretation mediated by long-term memory information. To form a 
mental representation of the text, readers combine different sources of information (van den 
Broek et al., 1998; Graesser et al., 1994). To accomplish this, readers activate previously 
acquired information that is stored in long-term memory, and combine it with information 
explicitly mentioned in the text (Kintsch, 1988; Gernsbacher, 1997). This means that people 
go beyond mere linguistic processes (i.e., just reading the words) when comprehending text 
(Martins, & Le Bouedec, 1998) to construct a relatively complex representation of the text.  
The apparent complexity of readers’ mental representations has raised several 
questions, mostly focused on which implied information, or in other words, which inferences, 
are automatically included in readers’ mental representations during reading and, naturally, 
on how to investigate them. In this paper, we are interested in one type of inference: 
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inferences of emotion. We also examine the self-paced reading paradigm. 
Inferences of emotions 
Several theories have been advanced to account for research focused on the automatic 
generation of inferences. Only two core theories of text comprehension are presented here, the 
constructionist and the minimalist approaches, as both make (fairly) clear, yet different, 
predictions about emotion inferences, and about their automatic inclusion in readers’ mental 
representations. The core principle underlying the constructionist approach is one of search 
(or effort)-after-meaning. This principle suggests that people naturally attempt to construct 
meaning from texts, social interactions and perceptual input (Bartlett, 1932, cited in Graesser 
et al., 1994). A central issue underlying the search-after-meaning approach is that of 
coherence. According to the constructionist approach, readers attempt to construct a mental 
representation of the text that enables them to maintain both local and global coherence. 
Inferences that establish local coherence essentially connect adjacent text constituents, 
whereas inferences that establish global coherence are deeper features such as general themes, 
or the moral of a text (Graesser et al., 1994), that connects most constituents of the text 
together. The constructionist approach considers emotion inferences as general features that 
guide readers’ understanding of the text, thus enabling them to maintain a global coherence. 
To quote Graesser et al. (1994, p. 382) : “The emotional reactions of characters and the 
subordinate goals play a prominent role in global plot configurations of stories and are 
therefore needed for the establishment of global coherence”. Therefore, the constructionist 
approach views emotions as being inferred during reading (p.382): “…the only causal 
consequences that are generated on-line are…(b) emotional reactions of characters to events 
and actions…”.  
According to the minimalist approach of reading, if readers do not adopt a specific 
goal-directed strategy; the number of inferences generated during reading is limited (McKoon 
and Ratcliff, 1992). The minimalist approach stipulates that only those inferences needed for 
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local coherence or those based on information that is readily available are generated during 
reading (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Such an approach is a little ambiguous regarding 
emotion inferences. Indeed, if one considers emotion inferences as crucial only for global 
coherence, the minimalist approach would imply that they are not inferred during reading. 
However, if emotion inferences are considered as necessary for local coherence, the 
minimalist position would probably predict that they are generated during reading. In essence, 
the automatic processing of emotion inferences according to the minimalist position largely 
depends upon coherence issues. In addition to this, one can also assume that, as readers search 
through their own experiences to understand emotions (Miall, 1989) and as we daily use 
emotions as a communicative tool (Oatley, 1998), emotional inferences might be based on 
information easily retrievable from long-term memory. Although we do believe that emotions 
are easily retrievable from long-term memory, it is likely that emotions are mainly needed for 
global coherence (as stated by Graesser et al., 1994) and hence we take the minimalist 
approach as being contrary to the notion that emotions are automatically inferred during 
reading.  
Contemporary research on emotion inferences can be traced to a study by Gernsbacher 
et al. (1992). They investigated the ability of readers to represent the situation described in a 
text, and especially their ability to represent the emotional status of the (main) characters. In 
their three experiments, they used two different paradigms: the first two experiments used the 
self-paced reading and the third experiment used a naming task. In this paper, we employed 
the self-paced reading paradigm to investigate emotion inferences during text comprehension. 
The assumption underlying such a task is that sentences that are congruent with readers’ 
current mental model of the situation should be read faster than sentences that are 
incongruent. Thus, reading time mirrors the ease with which a sentence is incorporated into 
the situation model. In their first experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) compared reading 
times of target sentences in short stories containing different emotion terms. For each story, 
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they first matched pairs of emotions that shared intensity, duration and relevance to self 
(Frijda, 1986) but that had opposite affective valence (e.g., Guilty-Proud, Bored-Curious, 
Sad-Joyful, Shy-Confident). They therefore compared reading times of target sentences 
containing either matching or mismatching target emotion words. Across the experiment, each 
emotion term was once tested as a matching emotion and once as a mismatching emotion. 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992) found that sentences were read significantly faster when they 
contained matching emotion terms than when they contained mismatching emotion terms. In 
their second experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) investigated whether emotional inferences 
were valence driven (i.e. do readers merely incorporate “global outcomes, for instance, 
whether the outcome is negative or positive” (p.100)). They compared reading times of target 
sentences containing matching (e.g., bored) and mismatching emotion words (e.g., angry) that 
had the same valence. The difference between reading times of sentences containing the 
matching and the mismatching emotion terms was smaller in this experiment than in the first 
experiment, but it was still significant, implying that emotional inferences were not mainly 
driven by valence. Gernsbacher et al. (1992) stressed the importance of the mismatching 
condition as a marker of readers’ mental representations. They stated that “the more the 
emotions words conflict with the implied emotional state, the more slowly their target 
sentences should be read”. The notion of slow reading processes as markers of readers’ 
mental representations is closely investigated in the present paper.  
From those experiments, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) suggested that readers do not 
integrate merely valence in their mental representation (i.e. the main character is feeling either 
positive or negative), but rather integrate specific emotions (i.e. sad or happy). Such 
specificity has been suggested not only in research on emotion inferences (e.g. de Vega, Leon, 
& Diaz, 1996; de Vega, Diaz, & Leon, 1997; Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; 
Gernsbacher, & Robertson, 1992; Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998) but also in 
research on characters’ trait inferences (Rapp, Gerrig, & Prentice, 2001), which indicated that 
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readers form a rather specific trait-based model of narrative protagonists, without particular 
effort.  
The notion of specificity was questioned by Gygax, Oakhill, and Garnham (2003) and 
Gygax, Garnham, and Oakhill (2004). In Gygax et al. (2003), using stories based on 
Gernsbacher et al. (1992), participants read target sentences containing either the initial 
matching emotion (e.g., sad from Gernsbacher et al., 1992), a matching synonym emotion 
(e.g., depressed), a matching similar emotion (e.g., useless) or a mismatching emotion (e.g., 
happy). Matching emotions were always read faster than the mismatching emotion, but there 
was no difference in reading times between sentences containing the different matching 
emotions. Gygax et al. (2004) extended these findings to stories that were made either longer 
(Experiments 1 & 2) or more ambiguous (Experiments 3 & 4). Both story manipulations were 
intended to make participants focus or concentrate on specific emotions. In the longer 
versions, Gygax et al. (2004) intended to provide sufficient information for readers to reach a 
specific representation of the main character's emotional status. In the ambiguous versions, 
they hoped to force participants into more effortful processing of the main character's 
emotional status, which was needed to resolve the ambiguity presented in the stories. Two 
different paradigms were used in Gygax et al. (2004): a forced-choice task and a self-paced 
reading task. In the forced-choice task experiments (Experiments 1 & 3), participants were 
explicitly asked to choose for each story the most appropriate emotion that described the main 
character’s emotional status among several emotions (initial, synonym, similar or 
mismatching). In the self-paced reading task experiments (Experiments 2 & 4), participants’ 
reading time for sentences containing different emotions were measured. For both story 
manipulations, when forced to make a choice among initial, synonym, similar or mismatching 
emotions, participants were more likely to select the initial emotion than the others. However, 
the self-pace reading task did not differentiate between the three matching emotions. The 
results of the self-paced reading experiments mirrored the ones found in Gygax et al. (2003), 
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leading the authors to conclude that readers do not represent specific emotions, at least not 
during reading (i.e., automatically). However, Gygax and colleagues suggested but never truly 
explained why readers' mental representations of emotion would be non-specific. In this 
paper, we attempt to give an explanation to account for the non-specificity of the mental 
representation of the main character's emotional status based on both theoretical and empirical 
foundations.  
The core theoretical idea behind our explanation of the non-specificity of emotion 
inferences is that readers include some information in their mental representations that is 
shared by several emotions. We suggest that readers include some physical behavioral 
response to their mental representations of the situations. By physical behavioral response, 
we refer to any movement, or lack of movement in response to the situation. For example, 
someone might clinch their fist in response to a frustrating situation or freeze in response to a 
scary situation. Essentially, we refer to such information as what the main character 
physically does in response to the situation. We believe that such a response to a situation is 
relatively easy to infer, at least easier than a fairly complex and abstract emotion 
representation. We further suggest that such information is connected to what we refer to as 
an emotion construct. In essence, readers construct a representation foundation, formed of 
stereotypical, or common information (i.e., behavioral reaction). As reading progresses, 
readers might elaborate that foundation to reach a more complex representation (i.e., specific 
emotions). In terms of Gernsbacher's (e.g., 1997) Structure Building framework, one could 
say that the structure foundation is composed of some behavioral elements, and that new 
information is mapped onto that developing structure.  
Such an idea somehow distances us from the too simplistic constructionist vs. 
minimalist dichotomy (an inference is or is not drawn). If readers infer some behavioral 
components, which, as will be explained in detail later, can be considered as part of an 
emotion construct, one can argue that emotion inferences are neither specific (as consistent 
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with the constructionist approach) nor absent (as consistent with the minimalist approach). 
Such an argument follows the idea that inferences are not encoded in an all-or-none fashion 
(van den Broek et al., 1998; Graesser et al., 1994; McKoon & Ratliff, 1990, 1992). This 
means that the emotion construct attached to the main protagonist is not entirely built and 
represented. The specificity and strength of the representation of a particular inference varies 
from situation to situation (van den Broek et al, 1998), and can change as new information is 
provided by the text. We further propose that the comprehension of a text does not need a 
complex and cognitively demanding representation of the main characters' emotional status, 
and that semantic parts of the complex representation may well be sufficient to assist reading 
comprehension.  
The self-paced reading paradigm 
As previously discussed, Gygax et al. (2004) suggested that readers make specific 
emotion inferences only when forced to (i.e., in a forced-choice task). In their self-paced 
reading task, participants were equally fast at reading sentences containing different matching 
emotions (e.g., sad, depressed and useless), but were always slower at reading mismatching 
emotions (e.g., happy). The match/mismatch effect was interpreted as evidence that readers do 
make emotion inferences, but the same match effect was interpreted as evidence that these 
inferences are not specific. Even though such a match/mismatch effect has often been 
interpreted as an indication of inference processing in emotion inference studies, researchers 
may have been a little hasty in their interpretation. More specifically, we believe that the 
studies that have used the self-paced reading paradigm have not been conducted in a way that 
would allow to distinguish between two alternative interpretations for faster reading of 
emotion terms. Faster reading times of matching information relative to mismatching 
information could be because it either matches inferences that have been already incorporated 
into readers’ mental model and therefore activates a previously made inference (i.e., inference 
activation), or it is simply consistent (or at least not inconsistent) with but does not match 
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information already included in the representation. The second alternative reflects what we 
refer to as context integration as compared to actual inference activation. What we mean by 
context integration is that information not previously incorporated in a mental representation 
might be read at a seemingly fast pace merely due to the fact that the information is not 
directly opposed to the context (e.g. somebody eating sweets when the it’s raining). The term 
integration is important here, as it mirrors the process by which new information may be 
integrated in readers’ mental representations. The two main questions therefore, at least for 
our purpose, are essentially (a) whether a match/mismatch effect, found in all previous studies 
on emotion inferences, does necessarily mean that the matching information has been 
included in readers’ mental representations and (b) whether the self-paced reading time 
paradigm can differentiate between inference activation and context integration.  
In the present experiment, we added a context integration manipulation to contrast it 
with our inference processing manipulation2 so that we could evaluate variation in differences 
between matching and mismatching conditions. Basically, an inference processing 
match/mismatch effect should be greater than a mere context integration match/mismatch 
effect. That greater difference mirrors a closer association between the information in the 
inference processing manipulation and the information in readers’ mental representations.     
 To investigate the context integration vs. inference processing issue, we added a 
control condition (using filler stories) in which we contrasted reading times of non-emotional 
sentences that were neutral to sentences that were contextually irrelevant. By neutral 
information, we refer to any sentence that can be easily integrated in the context. For 
example, the sentence I take the train is a neutral continuation of the sentence The weather is 
nice. Although the neutral sentence does not contradict the context established by the first 
sentence, it is very unlikely that it has been included in readers’ mental representations as 
readers processed the first sentence. It is important to note here that we do not see context 
integration and inference activation as a dichotomy per se (see Figure 1). Figure 1 represents 
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a continuum of integration ease, echoed by sentence reading speed.  The faster a sentence is 
read, the closer it resembles the information previously processed and incorporated in readers’ 
mental representations. However, a fast reading time, as shown in the figure, can but does not 
unequivocally mean that the information has been previously incorporated in readers’ mental 
representation; likewise, slow reading time does not necessarily mean that the information 
contradicts information included in readers’ mental representations. As shown in Figure 1, I 
take my bicycle may be more easily integrated in readers’ mental representation after The 
weather is nice than I take the train, but it does still not mean (although it’s possible) that the 
information has been already incorporated in readers’ mental model. When constructing the 
neutral sentences in the context integration manipulation, we made sure that the information 
tested had truly no chance of being incorporated in readers’ mental representations3 (in Figure 
1, the information needed as a control condition is in bold).  
By contextually irrelevant, we refer to any sentence that is difficult to integrate in the 
preceding context. For example, the sentence I don’t like public transport is an incongruent 
continuation of the sentence I take the train. Given the right explanation (i.e., My car is being 
repaired), the information that I take the train might not be so difficult to integrate in the 
context (it might even be inferred) but without that information, the sentence should normally 
be difficult to integrate. Using such a control condition permitted us to differentiate between 
integration and inference processes. To be interpreted as an inference processing indication, a 
match/mismatch difference in an emotion condition, or in a behavior condition, according to 
our aforementioned hypothesis, should be different than a match/mismatch difference in a 
neutral context integration condition as defined above. A similar match/mismatch difference 
might imply that our target information is easily integrated in readers’ mental representations, 
but not that it is inferred during reading.  
Method 
Participants 
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Twenty-four students from the University of Fribourg took part in this experiment as 
part of a course accreditation.  
Materials  
Experimental stories. Twenty-four stories from Gygax and Tapiero (2003) were used 
in this experiment. In Gygax and Tapiero (2003), thirty students were explicitly asked to write 
twenty-four stories each focused on specific given emotions. Gygax and Tapiero (2003), by 
instructing the participants to focus their stories on specific emotions tried to compel the 
participants to write sufficient context information to allow the inference of specific emotions. 
A categorical analysis of participants’ responses enabled them to construct twenty-four 
stereotypical stories using the most recurrent categories. These stories were generated by the 
participants and therefore represented the most salient stories to the chosen emotions (see 
Table 1 for an example story).  
Each story was present in four different versions, depending on the target sentence. 
The target sentence contained either a matching emotion, a mismatching emotion, a matching 
behavioral description or a mismatching behavioral description. Four lists were therefore 
constructed, to ensure that each participant would see all conditions and that each item was 
represented in each condition across the experiment. For each story, the matching behavior 
was matched with the matching emotion, and the mismatching behavior matched with the 
mismatching emotion.  
Filler stories. Twenty-four filler stories, with the same structure as the experimental 
stories, but emotionally neutral were also constructed. Out of the twenty-four filler stories, 
twelve were used to test the neutral match/mismatch question mentioned earlier. Six of these 
stories had a matching second sentence and six had a mismatching second sentence. In the 
latter case, the rest of the story was written so as to clarify the ambiguity raised by the 
presence of mismatching information (see Table 2 for examples of filler stories). We used the 
second sentence as the target sentence to ensure that the matching neutral information was 
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unlikely to have been incorporated in readers’ mental representations of the text (i.e. after just 
one sentence). A pilot study involving twenty participants ensured that the matching neutral 
sentences were indeed neutral and that the mismatching sentences were considered as 
mismatching the context. The participants in the pilot study were presented with two 
sentences and had to decide on a 7 pts scale whether the second sentence was an obvious 
continuation (score of 7), a possible continuation (score of 4) or an impossible continuation 
(score of 1). The results of the pilot study showed a significant difference between the 
sentences that we wanted to use as neutral (M = 4.28; SD = 0.6) and as contextually 
irrelevant (M = 1.55; SD = 0.22) (t (10) = -10.47; p < .0001).  The filler stories were the same 
for each participant.  
In total, forty-eight stories were presented to the participants: twenty-four 
experimental stories, twelve experimental filler stories and twelve normal filler stories. For 
each participant, these were presented in a random order. 
Apparatus 
The stories were presented on a Power Macintosh 4400 using Psyscope Software 
(Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). Responses to the target sentences of each 
story (final sentence in the experimental stories and second sentence in the filler stories) were 
collected using a response button box attached to the computer, which permits millisecond 
accuracy. Note that before analysing the results, the reading times were transformed to 
account for sentence length, readers’ particularities and position of the sentence within the 
text. The exact transformation is explained later.  
Procedure 
The participants were instructed to read the stories at a normal reading speed, as if 
they were reading a magazine. Each story was presented in three or four parts of one or two 
sentences and participants had to press the yes button when they finished reading each part. 
To make sure that participants read the stories carefully, some stories (N=16) were followed 
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by a question related to the text. Participants were asked to answer the questions by pressing a 
button labelled either yes or no. After the presentation of a story (including questions), the 
participants were prompted with the message Are you ready? followed by the story. Before 
the main part of the experiment, the participants read three practice stories, two of which were 
followed by a question, to familiarize them with the procedure and with the kinds of passages 
that they would be reading. 
Results and discussion 
The aim of this experiment was twofold. First, it was to demonstrate that behavioral 
information (as part of emotion) is a better marker of readers’ mental representation than 
emotions per se. Second, it was to assess whether the usual match/mismatch effect could be 
considered as a true indication of readers' mental representations of the main protagonist’s 
emotional status and not merely as a mirror of basic integration processes.  
Before conducting the statistical analysis, we transformed the data principally to 
account for the fact that the target sentences were not all of the same length and were not at 
the same position in the text. The transformation procedure was inspired by Trueswell, 
Tanenhaus and Garnsey (1994) and was conducted as followed: For each participant and for 
each manipulation, we produced a regression equation of time (i.e. reading time) against 
length (i.e. number of characters in the target sentence) using all 2nd sentences for the context 
integration manipulation and all 5th sentences for the inference processing manipulation. We 
separated the 2nd and 5th sentences in the regression analysis to account for different reading 
times due to different positions in the texts. The actual calculation is fairly simple. For the 
inference processing conditions, the reading time of each story’s 5th sentence was taken. The 
5th sentences that were not manipulated (i.e., the 5th sentences in the filler stories) were also 
considered for the regression. One could view these filler 5th sentences as control sentences, 
or baseline sentences, incorporated in the regression transformation. Then, for each 
participant, a time by sentence length regression was calculated by computing the slope and 
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the intercept of the regression. Residual reading times for each participant were then 
calculated by subtracting the actual reading times from the reading times predicted by the 
regression equation. Statistical analyses were conducted on the residuals. Negative residual 
times mean that reading times were longer than expected. Although relatively complex, this 
data transformation was needed to address differences in item length and position, as well as   
variations between participants. In this sense, a baseline reading measure is not needed for 
each participant, as it is already accounted for by the participant’s regression line. Mean 
residual times are shown in Figure 2.  
A general 3 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior vs. Neutral) X 2 (Match: Matching vs. 
Mismatching) repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of Match (F1 (1, 23) = 29.76 
and F2 (1,23) = 24.72; p < .0014), but most importantly, it showed an interaction effect for 
Match X Nature (F 1 (2, 46) = 7.85; p < .001 and F2 (2,46) = 4.22; p < .05). We explored the 
source of the interaction in separate follow-up ANOVAs that addressed the two main 
questions of this research. In the first follow-up we looked at whether emotion and behavior 
conditions produced different patterns in the matching and mismatching conditions. For this 
purpose, we examined the interaction of Match with respect to two of the three values of the 
Nature variable. Thus we conducted a 2 (Nature: Emotion vs. Behavior) X 2 (Match: 
Matching vs. Mismatching) repeated measure ANOVA. The ANOVA indicated a main effect 
of Match (F1 (1, 23) = 25.66; p < .001 and F2 (1,23) = 22.70; p < .01) and an interaction effect 
(F1 (1, 23) = 8.68; p < .01 and F2 (2,46) = 4.48; p < .05). As the means in Figure 2 show, the 
match/mismatch difference was the bigger in the behavior condition than in the emotion 
condition, implying that the behavior information is the closest information to the content of 
the participants’ mental representations. Such results support our first hypothesis, namely that 
behavioral information is a better marker of readers' mental representations of the main 
character’s emotional status than emotions per se. This follows the idea that, as suggested by 
Gygax et al. (2004), readers might only infer part(s) (i.e., behavioral components) of a 
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complex emotion construct in their mental representations. In essence, readers might attribute 
some intuitive or subjective feeling(s) to the character as they read through the text, but as this 
or these feelings are very difficult to incorporate into their mental representations, they 
include only some components of their construct in their representations. We do not suggest 
that readers are unable to infer specific and complex emotions, but as a result of limited 
processing capacity, we believe that emotions might be too complex to be fully integrated in 
readers’ mental representations in a normal reading process. If one were to see the 
construction of emotion inferences as a sequential process, we believe that given sufficient 
time, readers could infer more components of emotions, resulting in a more accurate 
representation of the main character’s emotional status. An alternative, yet related explanation 
of our behavior vs. emotion information could be rooted in the idea, introduced earlier, that 
readers build a structure foundation composed of different explicit and implicit elements, such 
as behaviors. As readers gradually accumulate these elements, they gather adequate 
information to encode a complex or specific emotion representation. Essentially, readers may 
need several particular elements to generate specific emotion representations. Gernsbacher et 
al. (1992) hinted that valence was one of the element, and we believe that behavioral response 
is another. Gygax and Tapiero (2003) suggested that other important elements to the 
generation of emotion representation include, for example, internal physical states (e.g., heart 
beating fast) or appraisal processes (e.g., she thought it was difficult).   
Two additional follow-up ANOVAs were necessary to examine the inference 
processing versus contextual integration explanation of a slow down in the mismatch 
condition. In the second follow-up of the interaction of Match with the three-level Nature 
variable, we looked at inference processing versus contextual integration by analyzing the 
Emotion and Neutral levels of the Nature variable and the Match (Matching vs. Mismatching) 
variable in a repeated measure ANOVA. This analysis only showed a main effect of Match 
(F1 (1, 23) = 28.85; p < .001 and F2 (1,23) = 16.72; p < .001), but no interaction effect. As 
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suggested earlier, a similar match/mismatch difference between these two conditions might 
imply that emotions are easily integrated in readers’ mental representations, but not that they 
were inferred during reading. In other words, because the mismatch cost for emotion words is 
similar to the cost for mismatch on neutral, we cannot distinguish between inference 
processes and context integration. The third follow-up ANOVA indicated that there was a 
significant interaction when behavior and neutral were examined with respect to the 
match/mismatch interaction. A 2 (Nature: Behavior vs. Neutral) X 2 (Match: Matching vs. 
Mismatching) repeated measure ANOVA showed a main effect of Match (F1 (1, 23) = 23.96; 
p < .001 and F2 (1,23) = 15.98; p < .01) as well as an interaction effect (F1 (1, 23) = 11.65; p < 
.01 and F2 (2,46) = 5.07; p < .05). As the means in Figure 2 show, the mismatch effect was 
significantly larger in the Behavior condition than in the Neutral condition. This implies that 
inference processes can be distinguished from context integration when the semantic element 
is a behavioral component. The pattern of data in the Nature x Match interaction indicate a 
significantly greater match/mismatch effect for behavior versus emotion and behavior versus 
neutral along with an equivalent match/mismatch effect for emotion versus neutral. This data 
pattern indicates that the self-paced reading paradigm can differentiate between context 
integration and inference processes but only for certain kinds of emotion-related semantic 
information, in this case behavioural information. For specific emotion words, self-paced 
reading did not distinguish between inference processes and contextual integration. These 
results are consistent with our proposals that emotion words might not be part of readers’ 
representations even though a significant match/mismatch effect is observed in self-paced 
reading time data. Thus, we have demonstrated that a match/mismatch effect during self-
paced reading does not necessarily mean that the matching information has been included in 
readers’ mental representations of the text. 
Our results on the behavior component of emotion confirm the idea that the 
constructionist vs. minimalist debate is not so informative here, as emotion inferences are 
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neither specific (constructionist position) nor entirely absent (our interpretation of the 
minimalist position). Instead, at least under normal conditions5, readers might only infer some 
components of the semantic construct of emotions. In our experiment, we tested behavioral 
elements, assuming that the content of readers' mental representations is closely related to 
such information. Of course, our results do not necessarily imply that readers infer specific 
behaviors. By using a self-paced reading paradigm, we cannot differentiate between forward 
and backward processes (Keenan, Potts, Golding & Jennings, 1990). When readers encounter 
the target behavioral information, the time it takes them to read the sentence mirrors the ease 
by which that information can be mapped onto the information in their mental representation. 
If the information in readers' mental representations is exactly the same as the one presented 
in the target sentence, the latter should be easily mapped onto the mental representation, as 
shown in Figure 2, and thus should be faster to read. However, if the information in readers' 
mental representations resembles or is closely related to the one presented in the target 
sentence, it should also be read faster. Our point is that the bigger the match/mismatch 
difference, the closer that information is to the content of readers' mental representations. It 
could be argued that faster reading times merely mirror the ease by which sentences 
containing behaviors are interpreted, or integrated in the context. Consequently, we may only 
have addressed different degrees of context integration. If this interpretation seems plausible 
for interpreting faster reading times, it seems more laborious to apply it to slower reading 
times of incongruent information. In a sense, incongruent sentences containing behaviors 
should also be faster interpreted as being incongruent, if the aforementioned explanation held 
true. The data however do not seem to support such an explanation.    
In this paper, we argue that a component likely to be inferred is the main character’s 
behavioral reactions to the situation. This idea stems from the strong link between emotions 
and behaviors (Consedine, Strongman, & Magai, 2003). In addition to this, we suggest that 
anticipating the main character’s physical reaction might enable readers to keep an open 
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representation of the main character’s emotional experience. A less complex representation 
such as a common behavior might be easier to modify than a more complex one, such as an 
emotion. It is likely, in narratives, that the main character undergoes emotional changes as the 
story evolves. Therefore, readers might have to modify their representation to account for 
different situations eliciting emotional reactions. It would be more effective and less effortful 
for readers to keep a non-specific representation of the main character’s emotional status. Any 
changes in the representation would thereafter be relatively fast and incur little cognitive cost.  
In contrast to this latter explanation, it is possible that readers might simply not have 
sufficient time (or cognitive ability) to construct a complex representation of emotions. 
Readers may just maintain a sufficient representation, or a more concrete one maybe, for 
comprehension purposes. If our results suggested that only semantic constituents of emotion 
might be integrated in readers’ mental representations, it is not to say that readers’ mental 
representations could not, at some particular time in the reading process, include specific 
emotions. Such an idea follows work from Calvo and Castillo (1996) who demonstrated that 
elaborative inferences do take time to build. In terms of emotion inferences, this means that 
the elaboration of a complex representation of emotion may well follow a specific sequence 
of which the first step is to generate a behavioral component to be included in the 
representation of the situation6.  
At this point, we would like to relate Gygax and colleagues' results of non-specificity 
to our present results. In their experiments, they found that reading times of sentences 
including different matching emotions did not differ. For example, for a story in which a man 
lost his job, had a car accident and found out that his wife wanted a divorce, there was no 
reading time differences between sentences containing depressed, miserable or useless.  There 
was no reading time differences because all three emotional states share some emotion 
component(s) that was (were) likely in readers' mental representation. We believe that as 
some common behaviors (e.g. lower your shoulders or cry) are tied in with several emotions, 
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it is not surprising that several emotions seemed to be equally inferred in Gygax et al. (2003) 
and Gygax et al. (2004). In fact, they all easily mapped onto the existing structure that 
encompassed some behavioral reaction. 
As a final note, we would like to stress that although the experiment presented here 
hinted that behavioral elements might be integrated in readers’ mental representations, we did 
not evaluate the life span of such elements, nor did we evaluate the influence that such 
information may play in processing subsequent information. Subsequent information might 
direct readers towards more specific or explicit emotions, resulting in a refinement of readers’ 
mental representations.  
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Footnotes 
1We define such a concept as the behavioral action (e.g. movement or lack of 
movement) associated to emotions, a kind of physical attitude reaction. We do not consider 
this concept of behavioral action to be the same as physiological reaction (e.g. heart beat,..), 
which could be tested in future research. 
2The terms manipulations and conditions are not to be confused here. In the context 
integration manipulation, we had to conditions, so did we in the inference processing 
manipulation. These conditions are explained in detail in the text. 
3In the example given above, there might be occasions in which the sentence I take my 
bicycle will be automatically inferred by readers (good weather might mean good weather for 
a bicycle ride for some people).  
4In order to perform a by Items analysis, we decided to compute each list as if they had 
different filler items. That way, we managed to get 24 items, facilitating the by-items 
analyses. 
5Under normal conditions means that the participants were not asked to adopt 
particular reading strategies. We are currently testing the idea that specific strategies 
(simulating the characters’ emotion for example) influence the complexity of the 
representation of emotions. 
6We are currently testing the hypothesis that as the time between sentence presentation 
increases, giving more time for participants to compute a complex mental model, the 
match/mismatch difference increases in the emotion condition (more complex emotion 
representation) whereas the match/mismatch difference in the behavior condition decreases. 
Preliminary results seems to indicate that this is the case. 
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Table 1 
Example of a story used in the experiment. 
Story: 
Suzanne came back from her regular visit to the nursing home. She walked slowly 
from the nursing home to her place. She thought of the days with her grandmother 
with a heavy heart. She had trouble retaining her tears when thinking of her 
grandmother alone in her room.  
Target sentences: 
Matching emotion: As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling sad.  
Mismatching emotion : As you could expect, Suzanne was feeling happy. 
Matching behavior: She sat on her settee, wrapped in a blanket. 
Mismatching behavior: She danced all night, as she was always  the one to show 
 others how to party 
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Table 2 
Examples of filler stories. In the first story, the second sentence is the matching neutral target 
sentence, and in the second story, the second sentence is the mismatching neutral target 
sentence . 
Story 1: Neutral matching 
Jean was writing and preparing for a conference in the East. He wanted to make the most out 
of this trip. He therefore planned several visits to his friends and to the people he knew on the 
way. He was taking his time to prepare for the trip and had been preparing since spring. 
Story 2: Neutral mismatching 
Cindy had just finished work and was going to her gym (au fitness in French). She thought 
that going to the gym  was individualistic and preferred volleyball. But after a knee injury, 
she could not play volley-ball any more. After changing, she entered the gym which was 
empty and dark. “That’s strange” she thought as she was warming up.  
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Figures Caption 
 
Figure 1 
Conceptual representation of reading times in relation to the extent to which a sentence 
matches its preceding context (context integration vs. inference processes). In this paper, we 
suggest that the self-paced reading paradigm can be useful, but appropriate control conditions 
(normal integration processes) need to compared to experimental conditions (inference 
processing conditions). In the example, we suggest that reading a sentence such as The 
whether is nice is more likely to active some information such as The sun is shining, hence 
decreasing the time to read the information, than information such as I take the train. 
However, we do believe the boundaries are not precise, and the continuation sentences may 
fluctuate along the line, depending on readers and reading conditions.   
Figure 2.  
Mean residual times in all the conditions. Negative residual times mean slower times. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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